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Introduction1
In common with other donors, the European
Union (EU) has given a large part of its aid as pro-
gramme aid in recent years, with 47 such pro-
grammes under Lome III and 64 under Lomé IV in
the years 1990-94. The EU is somewhat excep-
tional in the critical attention paid both to the
design of adjustment policies and evaluation
methodology for Balance of Payments (BOP) sup-
port. This paper, which reviews these issues, is
divided in three sections. Section 1 considers the
evaluations carried out by EU, including the actual
findings and the methodological issues related to
these works. Section 2 outlines some basic con-
cerns on evaluation methodology or lessons from
the experience, arising from the works carried out
and the debate in the European Commission.
Section 3 concludes.
I Evaluations Carried Out and
Methodological Discussions
EU experience in BOF support programmes in ACP
started in 1986-87, although only with Lomé IV
Convention (in 1990) were specific guidelines and
structures established to manage such pro-
grammes. Lomé IV Convention identified a two-
fold approach to BOP support programmes: a) they
are part of the global structural adjustment or
reform programme at country level; and b) they
aim at stressing specific concerns in the reform
process: long-term sustainability, national commit-
ment and social dimension.
Under Lomé III Convention (1986-90) EU
financed 47 BOF support programmes worth 807
MECU. Under Lomé IV, up to the end of 1994, 64
programmes were financed, for an amount of
1,180 MECU. These programmes can be classified
as either sectoral import programmes (SIPs) or gen-
eral import programmes (GIPs). In addition were
some 1,136 MECU of STABEX transfers, generally
included by Lomé IV in the same negotiation
framework as BOP support.
The author thanks the staff of the European
Commission, particularly Mr Sam McPherson
(consultant at the DGVIII Evaluation Unit), for their
collaboration in data collection and analysis. The
opinions expressed in the paper reflect the point of view
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The evaluation of the first BOP support
programmes
In 1990 the first global evaluation was carried out
by an external consultant on the programmes
funded under Lomé III Convention. The evaluation
focused on five countries (Benin, The Gambia,
Guinea-Bissau and Kenya). In this evaluation a spe-
cific methodological discussion is not explicit,
reflecting the early stage of EU experience in BOP
support programmes and the related lack of specific
methodological thinking. Particularly, there is an
overlap between the evaluation of the impact of the
structural adjustment programmes, whose success
the EU support was intended to contribute to, and
the effectiveness in the attainment of the specific
import support objectives included in the EU
action. There is also a wide discussion on project
design and project management issues.
The major findings of the evaluation were:
the analysis of the impact of structural adjust-
ment is very general, using a before/after
approach. Different indicators are considered
in different countries. The authors stress a gen-
erally positive impact, but the lack of method-
ological consistency makes these conclusions
weak and poorly justified;
on the effectiveness of EU import support pro-
grammes, the relative soundness of GIP and/or
SIP is discussed, showing that the latter played
a significant role for import recovery only in
countries with strong restrictions on imports.
In some countries (e.g. Uganda) SIPs have
helped specific sectors by allowing spare parts
imports and agricultural input supply to multi-
ply In some other countries, SIPs have pro-
vided basic commodities, like petrol in Guinea
Bissau, allowing wider access to imports by
other economic sectors. The question whether
GIPs would have played the same role or would
have been even more effective in resource allo-
cation is not raised. However, the ineffective-
ness of SIP, in countries with a convertible
currency, such as Benin, is noted.
2 Patrick and Sylviane Guillaumont (coordinators):
Ajustement et Développement: l'expérience des pays
ACP, Economica, Paris 1994.
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there is no discussion on the possible alterna-
tive uses of counterpart funds (CPFs). Although,
it is noted that they have played an important
role, when directly tied to the implementation
of key reforms included in the structural adjust-
ment (e.g.the retrenchment programme in Benin's
public administration).
this evaluation concentrates particularly on pro-
ject design, negotiation, monitoring and review.
It highlights the EU'S need to create specialized
units and staff and to establish adequate proce-
dures, once it has been decided to undertake
such programmes on a large scale.
Lomé IV: EU position on structural
adjustment and policy reform
Following the Lomé IV decision to get the EU much
more involved in structural adjustment and policy
reform in ACP countries, work was started, not only
to prepare and implement a new generation of
reform-based BOP support programmes, but also to
better define EU understanding of structural adjust-
ment and the specific concerns to be stressed in the
Lomé IV BOP support programmes. A study was
carried out and published in 1994,2 on behalf and
with the contribution of EU, which provides a gen-
eral evaluation of structural adjustment impact in
the ACP countries. The study makes a comparative
evaluation of the economic performance between
different groups of countries, both ACP and
non-ACP, with and without adjustment. Adopting
the Modified Control Group approach and econo-
metric models, the basic conclusion is that the
major factor determining the differences in eco-
nomic performance between the ACP and non-ACP
groups was the situation before the policy reform
process and not the policy measures adopted dur-
ing the process. The study also contains a number
of qualitative observations based on the analysis of
quantitative macroeconomic and sectoral indica-
tors. Based on such analysis, the study suggests
that structural adjustment programmes are charac-
terized by a number of recurrent weaknesses, that
should be looked into with the maximum attention
by EU.
This conclusion, together with an appreciation of
the EU specific contribution after Lome IV, have
been included in a communication of the European
Commission to the EU Council of October 1994.
Structural Adjustment is conidered an unavoidable
process toward sustainable development, although
many aspects must be reviewed. Therefore, a num-
ber of measures are recommended for future EU
action: a) including structural adjustment support
in the framework of long-term development agree-
ments with the recipient governments; b) helping
the governments in establishing new more trans-
parent and effective budget management methods;
stressing the social and the regional dimension;
enabling adequate levels of public and private
investment; e) strengthening coordination with
other donors; and f) increasing the coherence
among the different EU financial instruments for
policy support. An additional recommendation
included in the mentioned communication regards
the type of support provided by EU. This should
shift toward direct targeted budget support in
countries with a convertible currency.
See paragraph 2 of this section
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The evaluations carried out after Lomé IV
and the related methodological debate
In this framework, a number of country-level eval-
uations have been launched in 1994: in Ghana,
Uganda and Côte d'ivoire. In other countries the
evaluations are presently under way (Tanzania,
Cameroon and Zambia).
These evaluations have been preceded and accom-
panied by a lively debate in the Commission on
methodology. Unfortunately in its first phase such
debate was jeopardized by its concentration on the
use of the Logical Framework (LF - or Project Cycle
Management, PCM) approach and the possibility of
its application to BOF support evaluation. The
structure of the Logical Framework, discussed in
more detail below, is summarized in Table 1. An
extreme application of PCM - as was envisaged by
some of the participants - would have generated a
redundant analysis of the consistency between the
different stages of the Logical Framework, with lit-
tle concern for the impact and effectiveness of the
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reform process. In effect, some of the evaluation
teams found that a pressure in this sense had been
very energy consuming and detrimental for the
evaluation results.
On the other hand however, PCM detractors risked
denying that in EU programmes it was possible to
identify specific goals, purposes and measures. In
other terms, these programmes included different
targets and action levels, that an appropriate appli-
cation of the LF method could have helped to high-
light. As an example, in Table 2, a very general
break-down of the basic components of a typical
EU programme is given. An application of the
Logical Framework may help in better understand-
ing such components and their connections, both
in terms of internal coherence and relevance to the
external context.
Additional problems reflected in the discussion
were how to evaluate a programme, which (a) is
part of a global reform process, which is
multi-donor and multi-purpose, and whose main
inputs are not under the EU control; and (b) focuses
on some specific objectives, without being an inde-
pendent project.
The main findings of the evaluations on
Lomé IV programmes
The studies focused on some major areas, that may
be summarized as follows: a) the impact of the
global reform processes in which the EU has partic-
ipated through its own contribution; b) the effec-
tiveness of EU specific targeting in supporting
particular groups and development areas; and c)
the adequacy of EU capacity in managing such
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programmes. A very short synthesis of the main
findings in these three areas is provided below,
before the discussion of the methodological lessons
that can be learned from the experience.
Impact
Both the macroeconomic and social impact of the
comprehensive programmes were found to be
broadly positive (with the partial exception of Côte
d'Ivoire, which, until mid 1994, was in a position of
stagnation of all macroeconomic indicators).
However, in each case a number of specific reserva-
tions were expressed with respect to the sustain-
ability and depth of these improvements,
particularly in terms of the long term macroeco-
nomic situation in all three countries.
For example, the economic impact of the compre-
hensive SAP programme in Ghana has been found
to be 'patchy' and contradictory; thus, on the one
hand the SAP has undoubtedly had a positive
impact on stabilization and growth - mainly due to
the massive external support, the liberalization of
trade and exchange rate policies and the rigorous
budget policies carried out in the mid 1980s.
However, on the other hand, there has been a dis-
appointing impact of the SAP; in terms of public
sector spending (which has increased, due to the
delay in SOEs' privatization), private sector
investment (which has stagnated at very low levels)
and, recently, the poor performance in terms of a
number of other macro indicators (e.g. a return to
high rates of inflation and a burgeoning public
domestic debt).






Export oriented agricultural producers
Instrument(s)
Support to overall SAP programme (eg
through general BOP support and STABEX
allocations)
Specific objectives of EU within SAP
Framework (eg through tied GIP, CPFs and/or
targeted budget support)
STABEX allocations and related CPFs
Table 2 Target beneficiaries and instruments of a typical EU BOP-SP
Until very recently the situation in Côte d'ivoire
was found to be even worse - with the authors
concluding that the SAP support had little impact
on nearly all aspects of the macroeconomy prior to
the devaluation of the real exchange rate at the
beginning of 1994. Importantly however, since the
devaluation there have been very encouraging
indications of a dramatic (though, by no means,
complete) improvement in its performance (partic-
ularly with respect to increases in the private and
public investments). Although encouraging, great
caution is required with respect to these develop-
ments due to the fact that they are so recent and
may yet prove unsustainable. This latter point is
also made in the case of Uganda which in many
respects constitutes the most encouraging perfor-
mance of the countries considered.
In terms of the (long term) social impact of the
global SAPs, the evaluations highlighted somewhat
contradictory results. The social impact of the com-
prehensive SAP has been generally positive - most
so in Ghana but less so in Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire
- due to the fact that the limited economic growth
that has been achieved, has generated employment
and served to increase (or at least partially preserve)
the budget resources reserved to the social sectors.
However, in all three countries several problems
were exposed in terms of the depth and sustainabil-
ity of these results. For example, in Ghana the
recorded increase in employment of approximately
four per cent per year was largely due to an increase
in informal employment (characterized by tempo-
rality, instability and extreme uncertainty) rather
than any increase in 'structured' stable private
employment - the failure of the latter being due to
the low medium-long term investment in the pri-
vate sector mentioned above.
Effectiveness
The EU promotion of its main concerns (support
to health and education, and, in some cases, to
decentralization and private sector) was found to
have achieved a varied level of success. For exam-
ple in Ghana and Uganda the disappointing level
of success - both in terms of improving the empha-
sis of the recipient governments on these areas and
of significantly improving the programmes' effec-
tiveness on these issues. Somewhat in contrast,
however, the evaluation carried out in Côte d'Ivoire
found that a significant proportion of the EU
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sponsored operations in these areas (the health
sector especially) had been very effective.
lt was generally found that the provision of GIPs to
provide direct support to private investment in
Ghana and Uganda has not proven effective. Also
when (as in the EU case) GIPs are reserved for pri-
vate sector imports, the mechanism in itself is not
able to avoid the fact that the government profits
better than the private sector from the additional
availability of foreign currency created by a GIP.
Also in Ghana and Uganda, it was found that the
tying of CPF to specific budget lines to support the
social sectors proved to have a limited effectiveness:
for example, it did not necessarily prevent the
recipient governments from cutting the untied part
of the relevant budgets and then operating budget
reviews andlor creative budget management. On
the positive side, however, in Côte d'ivoire a num-
ber (but not all) of the EU operations in this area
did seem to have a significant success; particularly
with reference to the EU supported programmes
designed to reform the supply and distribution of
essential drugs; those designed to improve the
working conditions of the health professions; and
some of the measures designed to protect the most
vulnerable groups from the negative impacts of the
deteriorating macroeconomic situation The differ-
ent level of effectiveness was probably due to the
high concentration and relative importance of EU
funds in the health sector (80 per cent of non-staff
expenditure), in Côte d'Ivoire, combined with the
existence of a detailed plan of action to use the
funds and a strong political commitment by the
government.
With respect to the STABEX instrument, most criti-
cism in the three countries regard the system itself,
which is characterized by an erratic nature and
cumbersome disbursement procedures that create
enormous delays. Both these aspects make the
instrument very inflexible and not easy to manage
for policy reform objectives.
Programme management
All three evaluations concluded that the instru-
ments utilized by European Commission represent
a considerable effort to translate into practice, in
a relatively short time, the rather complex EU
position established in Lome IV Convention on
structural adjustment. However, the need to
increase design and monitor capacity, improve
mechanisms and procedures, and speed up dis-
bursement was widely stressed.
Inclusion of BOP support in a long term develop-
ment perspective - as suggested by EU documents -
requires the participation of EU in policy dialogue
and the related support to governments for budget
management, including technical assistance for the
design and monitoring of the plans of action related
to the areas of major EU concern. In both Uganda
and Ghana, it was found that EU had not ade-
quately participated in the policy dialogue process
so as to help and encourage the governments, for
example, to provide clearer positive signals of their
commitment to improve private sector initiatives
and participation. This point is supported by the
Côte d'Ivoire evaluation which found that in health
and decentralization programmes in which the EU
was effectively a 'leader' in policy dialogue and
implementation, the effects were far more substan-
tial than in those in which the EU adopted a 'fol-
lower's' role.
Concerning this latter point, in all the successful
operations in Côte d'Ivoire, the EU played an
extremely active role in defining areas of operation
and ensuring that targeting of recipients was well
focused through specific improvement of the bud-
getary process and execution (which was often not
the case in Uganda and Ghana). In addition, the
Ivorian government was particularly well disposed
to ensuring that these priority operations were
successful.
The evaluations also highlighted a number of prob-
lems stemming from the specific context character-
izing each country (the macroeconomic situation,
the orientation of state bodies, the institutional
capacity at various levels, etc.). The still limited
resources of the EU do not allow adequate consid-
eration of these factors in the phases of programme
design and review In several cases it was con-
cluded that the potential positive impact of the pro-
grammes was severely undermined due to
conflicting actions by state bodies. For example,
the failure of some governments to develop and
impose a suitable pricing policy for some of the
products which were supported through the
STABEX: indeed the evaluations highlighted a
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number of actions on the part of some governments
which directly contradicted the aims of the
STABEX; the attempt to raise export taxes on cocoa
exports by the government of Ghana provides a
good example.
Another major problem regarding implementation
relates to the lack of transparency of the financial
controls and procedures in the budgetary account-
ing systems in each country, creating substantial
problems in terms of fungibility, 'creative account-
ing', and the actual endpoint expenditure delivery
The issue of expenditure delivery was deemed par-
ticularly important and came up at various points in
the evaluations of all three countries. In addition,
basic mismanagement within organizations (such
as the District Municipalities in Côte d'Ivoire, for
example) was highlighted as a significant problem
which could potentially undermine some of the
reform measures that were promoted through the
implementation of STABEX.
The major recommendations issued by the
evaluations
Despite the differences among the three countries,
some common conclusions can be highlighted:
the need for greater participation, and leader-
ship, of the EU in the policy dialogue, programme
preparation and monitoring - especially with
reference to the promotion of the EU'S priority
concerns.
the need to improve administrative and accoun-
tancy procedures in state and parastatal bodies
so that transparency and effectiveness is
increased. This implies that greater assistance
should be. given to the process whereby the
administrative capacity of implementing agen-
cies can be built up and suggests that the EU
funded technical assistants should take more
responsibilities and be more involved in this
process;
the application of the recommendations (a)
and (b) would encourage more effective target-
ing mechanisms, by shifting toward direct
budget support (or through CPFs, in the coun-
tries without convertible currency) toward a
set of activities, to be agreed upon during bud-
get preparation, designed and assisted for
implementation. This, it is suggested, may
include greater tying of EU support to perfor-
mance improvements in the priority sectors so
that actual expenditures in these areas are
ensured - as opposed to relying on stated allo-
cations, for example, which sometimes do not
translate in to expenditures;
improve complementarity with project based
support such that the coherence of the EU
approach is better ensured;
improve complementarity with the EU mem-
ber states, at least in the field of BOP support
programmes.
2 Lessons for Evaluation
Methodology for BOP support
programmes
During the evaluation exercise, the debate on
methodology in the European Commission identi-
fied a number of convergent points which have
been confirmed by practice. In both the work at
country level and the evaluation guidelines under
preparation by the Commission, the possible appli-
cation and usefulness of the Logical Framework
(LF) approach have been reviewed. The LF is no
longer considered a methodology, but rather a use-
ful tool making explicit all the components of a pro-
gramme: development goals, specific objectives and
target beneficiaries, detailed activities and the
accompanying measures. The LF helps the evalua-
tor understand the programme's structure and con-
sistency: i.e. how it was prepared and the coherence
between objectives and means. It offers little help,
however, with respect to the evaluation methodol-
ogy, which has to respond to a number of specific
issues: relevance, impact, effectiveness and effi-
ciency of any particular BOP support programme.
The evaluation of relevance
The assessment of relevance constitutes a prelimi-
nary exercise in the evaluation of a BOF support
programme (Table 1). The basic question is : 'Is it
realistic to expect any significant outcome from the
programme?', leading the evaluator to consider the
following issues:
a) the relative size of the programme (including
connected funds), compared to the total funds
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allocated to the global reform process
(macro-relevance) and to the specific amount of
funds allocated in target sectors and/or to target
groups (micro and sectoral relevance);
the political and economic environment:
whether the country is shackled by heavy polit-
ical instability, or its capacity to undertake a
global reform process is limited by external fac-
tors (e.g. the fixed exchange rate in Côte
d'ivoire until December 1993);
the specific constraints of a country, as they are
perceived by its social leaders and the govern-
ment: are the programme's specific objectives
and actions easy to internalize by the govern-
ment and/or by significant social groups in the
country?
The assessment of relevance determines all the fol-
lowing steps. According to its results different
hypotheses may follow for the evaluation exercise.
The assessment of relevance basically regards the
evaluation of the programme preparation phase and
of programme reviews. The use of the LF to analyse
the programme preparation process appears very
useful.
The evaluation of the impact
A first question is: the impact of which programme?
The impact of the structural adjustment programme
to which the EU contributes at macro and sectoral
level, as well as on the conditions of different target
groups? Or the impact of the EU programme in
itself? The question is not easy to answer, but both
the practice and the methodological discussions
have shown that it is not possible to isolate the
impact of the EU programmes. Any global or spe-
cific impact expected should be seen as a conse-
quence of the global reform process. In the
methodological discussion on evaluation, 'impact' is
intended as the change produced by a concentra-
tion of actions, which are not all necessarily
directed toward the attainment of that change. One
may look at the 'effects' of one action or another in
a programme ensemble, but it would be difficult to
speak about the 'impact' of such a single component
(see the 'effectiveness' evaluation, below).
If the EU contribution has extended over a suffi-
ciently long period (e.g. not less than five years),
then the impact evaluation of the reform process
includes the impact evaluation of the EU contribu-
tion.4 If not, as is the case in most countries, the
impact evaluation just highlights the global frame-
work in which the EU intervention is going to fit.
Impact evaluation should consider all the main
objectives of the global reform programme, i.e.
macroeconomic balances, liberalization and stabi-
lization of prices and exchange rate, regulatory
framework reform, public and private investment,
social dimension and trade.5 Even when a specific
programme intends only to provide direct support
to BOP (which is not the case of the EU pro-
grammes), it should be evaluated in the same way,
if it is conceived as part of the global reform process
that justifies BOP support.
A second very important question is: what kind of
evaluation should be adopted to assess the impact
of the programmes? Would a 'before/after' approach
be acceptable, despite the fact that it overlooks the
importance of both starting conditions and external
factors? Would not a 'with/without' approach be
better, despite the complexity of the exercise when
it is applied to the assessment of a global economic
process? All three evaluations of the EU pro-
grammes have adopted a 'before/after' approach to
assess the impact of the country reform processes.
No innovations have been adopted with respect to
the well established practice of, for instance, the
World Bank reports on country evaluation of struc-
tural adjustment. No mathematical models have
been used, since it has been deemed that the costs
of such modelling were not justified by its possible
advantages. The usual analysis of the historical
statistical data of the major indicators has been
carried out.
Wide use has been made of existing surveys, and
sectoral and microeconomic studies, whose impor-
tance should not be overlooked in countries with a
long experience of structural adjustment. Direct
observation, especially through the organization of
Rapid Appraisal groups, e.g. among economic oper-
ators, has been found very useful. Comparative
In such cases, if the relevance of FC programmes is
sufficiently high, it would be worthwhile to carry out a
double impact evaluation of the reform process:
'before/after' its start up and 'before/after' the EU
participation
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references with other countries, e.g. in the same
sub-region, have been used to better evaluate the
national performances in different fields.
This work has provided a sound basis for the iden-
tification of the strong and weak points of the
reform processes and to better focus the EU pro-
grammes. On the other hand, however, this type of
evaluation needs much more work on standardiza-
tion by the Commission. The three reports present
several significant differences: for example, in some
cases, the impact evaluation is carried out without
a specific emphasis on the main EU concerns; and
in other cases the impact evaluation is somewhat
overlooked and there is a concentration on the
specific actions promoted by EU.
The evaluation of the effectiveness
The effectiveness of a programme is shown by the
production of positive results. Therefore, it is pos-
sible to assess the effectiveness of a programme only
when the programme states purposes and expected
results that are well identified, relatively isolable
and verifiable. Such purposes and results may be
well highlighted (or even made explicit, if they are
not) by the application of the Logical Framework.
For example: the three programmes mentioned
included the purpose of increasing the access of the
poorest to the basic health services; in some cases,
dismantling of parastatals and support to
retrenched workers was envisaged; in other cases,
direct support to the private sector was considered.
Since the assessment of effectiveness regards rela-
tively short-term horizons and relatively isolable
phenomena, it is possible and necessary to apply a
'with/without' analysis. Although not on a system-
atic basis, the three evaluations have applied this
method to assess effectiveness. For example: in
Ghana, it was argued that the support provided by
the EU to the health budget did not prevent the
government from cutting the relevant allocation
and that the budget-tied CPFs in the sector did not
produce any direct visible progress compared to the
existing standards; in Côte d'Ivoire, it was found
that some EU promoted actions in the health sector
According to the Logical Framework terminology,
'impact' should be assessed on the basis of the 'general
objectives' or 'goals' of a programme. But the evaluator
should be able to disaggregate such 'goals', since they are
normally expressed in a very generic and standard way:
were, on the other hand, very effective, since the
funds had allowed a unexpected jump in the bud-
get allocation and ensured the implementation of
key operations, like the supply of low-cost drugs
on the market.
It should be noted, however, that the 'withlwith-
out' analysis always presents some subjective mar-
gins, since the 'without' situation must be
supposed and the temptation to assume that it
would have been very similar to the 'before' sce-
nario is strong. This is why an analysis of EU role
in the negotiation process is very important. For
example: did the EU just provide financial support
to actions already foreseen in the global reform
process (see, workers retrenchment in Ghanaian
COCOBOD); or did it take the lead in the reform
process in a specific sub-sector (see recovery of
state intervention in the health sector, in Côte
d'ivoire)?, in the case of Ghana, the 'without' sce-
nario would probably have been a slowing down of
the retrenchment plans; in the case of Côte
d'ivoire, it would have been the collapse of state
intervention in health. In both the cases, EU action
was considered effective. The effectiveness in
Ghana, however, was limited to the positive EU
contribution to the implementation of the existing
COCOBOD restructuring programme: the effec-
tiveness of such a programme on the target benefi-
ciaries was considered weak.
The evaluation of management capability
(or efficiency)
This part of the evaluation does not regard simply
efficiency in running the project activities. It seems
better to extend the concept of efficiency, as it has
been used in some recent documents of the DGVIII
evaluation unit in the European Commission, to
cover the whole programme cycle, including nego-
tiation and design, implementation, monitoring
and evaluation. In this larger sense, it is probably
better to use the word 'capability', or 'management
capability'.6
In the evaluations this section is dealt with in a
scattered fashion. A specific assessment of the effi-
ciency is carried out only with reference to the pro-
gramme activities in a strict sense, i.e. the
According to the Logical Framework scheme, it is the relationship between activities and results. Such a
often said that this part of the evaluation should regard formulation appears too strict and risky
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transparency and the delays in fund management
and disbursement. This makes the specific section
rather poor and does not allow any focus on the
management capability issues underlying both the
successes and failures of the programmes.
Assessing management capabilities in the different
steps of the 'project cycle management' should
include the various actors of the programmes:
Commission, government and inter-agency coordi-
nation. Although the bulk of the attention has to be
reserved for the Commission, the management
capability (including commitment) of the other
actors may be very important in explaining some
specific features of the programmes. For example,
the mechanisms of consultation among the parties,
the modalities employed in adequate policy dia-
logue and continuous concentration should be
assessed under this section. This analysis should
focus on both functional problems, that may be
resolved through a review of procedures and
changes in the attitude of participants, and on
structural problems, that should be faced through
the establishment of new capacities and operational
means (including staff). Among the latter, most
evaluations have stressed a better coordination of
the Commission's instruments (NIP, food aid, etc.),
the strengthening of the Commission's capacities in
policy analysis and management and the increase in
Commission's staff at country level.
3 Conclusion
The EU began BOP support aid under Lomé Ill,
though the evaluation of that aid focused mainly on
issues of effectiveness. With Lomé IV the EU
became more involved in structural adjustment and
undertook a critical review of such programmes,
and also initiated an internal debate on the evalua-
tion methodology for such aid, focusing on the
possible use of the Logical Framework. This paper
has presented results of subsequent evaluations of
BOP support in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya and Uganda, based
around the LE The LF has proved a useful frame-
work for analysis, but does not solve all the prob-
lems facing the evaluator, such as the appropriate
methodology for analysing impact.
